Introduction
Dealing with North Korea is perhaps one of the most difficult diplomatic challenges in global politics today. Totalitarian and reclusive, ideologically isolated and economically ruined, its actions create a range of dilemmas for political analysts and policy makers alike. Pyongyang's demonstrated nuclear ambition substantially increases the risk of a nuclear arms race in the region and an escalation of the security situation with possible global consequences. The latest escalation began in the autumn of 2002, when Pyongyang admitted to a secret nuclear weapons programme and subsequently withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. By early 2003 both the US and North Korea threatened each other with outright war. The situation became even more tense in October 2006, when the UN Security Council unanimously decided on tough sanctions in response to Pyongyang's announcement that it had successfully completed its first nuclear test. Some of the tensions were diffused through an agreement reached in early 2007, when North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear programme. The precondition for detente seemed to increase further with the election of US president Barack Obama, who signalled the advent of a more nuanced and cooperative US foreign policy. But by mid-2009 the situation was as tense as ever after North Korea conducted several new nuclear and missile tests and announced, yet again, that it would renege on its commitment to nuclear disarmament.
Finding sustainable diplomacies towards North Korea is neither obvious nor easy. Diplomatic debates are correspondingly polarized. At one end of the spectrum are advocates of a confrontational policy, which relies on the projection of military threats and aims to undermine the authoritarian regime as fast as possible, leading to a quick disintegration and subsequent absorption. The second approach favours engaging North Korea in political, economic and cultural interactions. It is based on what is often called the 'soft-landing scenario', which seeks a gradual integration of North Korea into the world community.
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss these opposing approaches to diplomacy in Korea. I begin by demonstrating that there are serious shortcomings with the prevailing logic of confrontation and deterrence, which has clearly failed to bring lasting peace to Korea. I illustrate why confrontational approaches, exemplified by the US policy under president George W. Bush, often run the risk of further entrenching the antagonisms they seek to resolve or contain. Decision makers and other political elites who employ this approach tend to see security primarily in military terms: a threat must be countered with a credible threat in order to pose a deterrent. Rather than solving the problems at stake, the ensuing political attitudes risk reproducing and further entrenching the very antagonisms that created violence and trauma in the first place.
Policies based on engagement offer a viable alternative to a confrontational stance. Historically they have had a better chance of easing tensions on the peninsula. As practised by the South Korean government under presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, engagement promotes various interactions between North and South. Particularly crucial here are those interactions that engender face-to-face encounters among average citizens across the dividing line. Over time, such contacts can help to reduce the high levels of mutual antagonism and distrust that have fuelled conflict on the peninsula for half a century. But there are clear limits to engagement as well. It certainly has not led to a definitive breakthrough either. Pyongyang's nuclear ambition remains as alive as ever. In fact, the latest round of nuclear tests emerged directly after the new US president, Barack Obama, eschewed his predecessor's confrontational approach and signalled a new willingness to engage North Korea in fruitful negotiations.
A truly sustainable diplomacy in Korea needs to go beyond the prevailing confrontation/engagement dichotomy. Needed is what the editors of this book defined in their Introduction as sustainable diplomacies: a certain sensitivity to the interconnectedness of security issues, including a sensitivity to how the world might look like if viewed from the vantage-point of the arch enemy -in this case North Korea. To imagine the world from Pyongyang is not to legitimize its authoritarian regime or its abysmal human rights record, but to understand why security dilemmas have become what they are. The result would be a form of
